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Summary 
 While the international climate change nego-
tiations have always been based on coali-
tions, the number of negotiating groups has 
increased dramatically since around 2005, 
with most (developing) countries partici-
pating in several coalitions. 
 While more coalitions may make it harder to 
find compromises simply because more ac-
tors are actively involved in the discussions, 
it is not clear to what extent coalitions coop-
erate with one another and thus mitigate 
this effect. 
 As many of the new coalitions tend to be 
thematically or regionally more focused, 
more countries may feel that their positions 
are better represented. 
 Despite this, smaller and poorer countries—
those that tend to join more coalitions—may 
struggle to coordinate within the increasing 
number of groups to which they are mem-
bers. Negotiators—particularly from smaller 
countries—should become more aware of 
these potential implications of participating 
in many coalitions.  
Coalitions in the UNFCCC negotiation 
Like all multilateral negotiations, the international 
climate change negotiations under the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) are based on coalitions or alliances. Rather 
than as individual countries, Parties to the UNFCCC 
tend to participate in the negotiations within groups 
of countries. We use the term coalition to refer to 
any group of countries that puts forward common 
proposals in the negotiations.  
Coalitions serve two main functions. First, they reduce 
complexity; negotiations become more manageable 
when a handful of groups interact rather than almost 
200 individual countries. Second, they improve the 
bargaining power of their members. When pooling 
their resources, countries can participate more effec-
tively in the complex climate negotiations; additional-
ly, a larger number of countries behind a specific posi-
tion gives this position more weight.1 As such, coali-
tions are of particular importance to smaller and 
poorer countries that individually lack negotiating ca-
pacity and bargaining power.2  
While coalitions were thus a defining character of the 
UNFCCC negotiations since their inception, the land-
scape of climate coalitions has changed dramatically 
over the course of the negotiations. While only a 
handful of coalitions were active in the early years up 
to 2005, the negotiations since have seen a dramatic 
increase in the number of country groups involved. 
Since the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and 
negotiations for a subsequent agreement, a large 
number of new coalitions has formed, notably within 
the group of developing countries. At the same time, 
the “old” coalitions persisted, so that we now have a 
range of partly overlapping coalitions active in the 
climate change negotiations. 
In this policy brief, we trace all groups of countries 
that have been active in the climate change negotia-
tions and map out the diversity of these groups and 
their membership. We then discuss the implications 
of this fragmented landscape of climate coalitions for 
the overall negotiation dynamics and outcomes, and 
for climate justice in particular.   
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Mapping coalitions and coalition mem-
bership 
Coalitions over time 
Figure 1 maps out all coalitions that have intervened 
in the negotiations as a group according to reports 
by the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB).   
Figure  1: Coalitions in the climate change negotia-
tions. Coalitions with only developing country 
members are in blue; coalitions with developed 
country members only are in yellow; coalitions with 
mixed membership are in green. Based on ENB re-
ports of the negotiations.  
Three trends can be observed. First, there is a clear 
increase in the number of coalitions after 2005, that 
is, after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force 
and negotiations started to revolve around a succes-
sor agreement. While five coalitions were active at 
the very first Conference of the Parties (COP1) in 
1995, 19 different coalitions intervened in the nego-
tiations at the 2015 Paris climate summit (COP23).  
Second, coalitions tend to persist once they are 
formed. Of the 26 coalitions that are recorded in the 
ENB reports, only seven ceased their activities. In 
other words, new coalitions form in addition to older 
groupings rather than replace them.  
Third, most coalitions formed within the group of 
developing countries. In particular the “new” coali-
tions are often regional groups that consist almost 
exclusively of developing countries, such as the Con-
go Basin, the Arab Group, or the Association of Inde-
pendent Latin American Countries (AILAC). In con-
trast, developed countries largely operate within just 
two groups—the EU (which is itself Party to the UN-
FCCC) on the one hand and the Umbrella Group 
(formerly JUSSCANNZ) on the other. Eastern Europe-
an countries additionally had active coalitions 
(Visegrad and Central Group 11) during a brief peri-
od in the late 1990s/early 2000s, but then joined the 
EU. Finally, very few coalitions have mixed member-
ship, notably the Environmental Integrity Group 
(EIG) that includes both non-Annex I and OECD 
member countries.3 
Membership 
Figure 2 displays how coalition membership across 
the world has evolved from the year 2005 to 2015. 
The maps show how many coalitions each country is 
member of in those two years, with darker colours 
reflecting more coalition memberships.  
The maps reflect the growing number of coalitions in 
the climate realm; while on average countries were 
members of around two coalitions in 2005, this num-
ber has increased to almost four coalition member-
ships in 2015.  
Figure  2: Evolution of coalition memberships over 
time.5  
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Coalition membership varies across countries, 
though. The industrialized Annex I countries tend to 
restrict their activities to only one or two coalitions. 
In contrast, the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
active in 10 coalitions in 2015.4 
Countries in the global South tend to join more coali-
tions in the climate change negotiations. This pattern 
was even stronger in 2015: it is mostly developing 
countries that establish and join new coalitions in 
the climate change negotiations. Furthermore, even 
within the group of developing countries, we find 
that it is poorer countries, countries that are more 
vulnerable to climate change, and countries that 
generate less greenhouse gas emissions per capita 
that tend to join more coalitions—presumably be-
cause they depend to a larger extent on the support 
of others to make their voice heard. 
Implications for the negotiations 
What does the increasing fragmentation of climate 
change negotiations imply for the negotiation dy-
namics and outcomes on the one hand, and proce-
dural justice on the other?  
With regard to overall negotiation dynamics and ne-
gotiation outcomes, the presence of ever more coali-
tions may make it presumably harder to find com-
promises and reach agreements. In practice, howev-
er, the positions of individual coalitions may not di-
verge that strongly—the Climate Vulnerable Forum 
(CVF), the Vulnerable 20 (V20), AOSIS and LDCs for 
instance tend to have similar positions and support 
each other.  
In addition, given that many of the new coalitions 
are thematically or regionally more focused, more 
countries may feel involved and willing to provide 
input because now they can look for the most appro-
priate forum to have their own national positions 
represented. For example, countries that have large 
forests may join the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, 
while vulnerable countries may join the CVF. Now, 
such specific topics do not need to be agreed upon in 
a larger group such as the G77 & China.  
With regard to procedural justice, as discussed 
above, smaller and poorer countries tend to join 
more coalitions than their larger and richer counter-
parts. Although the former also benefit the most 
from joining forces with like-minded countries, it is 
as yet unclear how they benefit from and deal with 
membership in multiple coalitions. On the one hand, 
it is plausible that multiple memberships make par-
ticipation in the negotiations even more difficult be-
cause coordination costs increase. Small country del-
egations struggle to coordinate with multiple groups 
and to attend all coordination meetings. For exam-
ple, at COP23, small island states, Least Developed 
Countries, the African Group and G77 & China met 
twice every day, while other groups met every day. 
For a typical developing country, this easily amounts 
to at least six hours of coordination meetings only.6   
On the other hand, countries may not be equally 
active in all coalitions in which they are formally a 
member. Multiple memberships also mean multiple 
venues to promote one’s national position and to 
find allies. From this perspective, more coalitions 
mean more influence—if coalitions support each 
other. 
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Policy recommendations 
Despite its potentially profound impact on the cli-
mate change negotiations, the changing landscape 
of climate coalitions has not yet been studied at 
length.7 At this point, we therefore do not know 
how and why new coalitions form or how they im-
pact the overall negotiations as well as the strate-
gies and influence of individual countries. More 
research is clearly needed. This research should in 
particular pay attention to how the negotiators 
themselves experience and evaluate the changing 
character of the negotiations.  
Even if we do not know how the fragmentation 
into ever more coalitions affects the overall negoti-
ations, it is likely that it has an effect. The negotia-
tions should acknowledge this effect and actively 
debate what role coalitions play, including how 
they help or hinder the participation of individual 
countries.  
Finally, countries themselves should take stock of 
their coalition membership(s) and reflect on how 
their participation in several groups helps or hin-
ders their active engagement in the climate change 
negotiations.  
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